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Potential Impacts on Individuals Caused by the 
Invasion of NGOs into International Politics 
Zhao Li, Haibin Qi   
ABSTRACT: In the contemporary world, NGOs are playing signifi-
cant roles in international cooperation and globalization. This active-
ly promotes the formation of a global society.  Accompanying that, 
NGOs also have an increased international political influence.  
Against this background, some scholars believe the rise of NGOs will 
create an era of individuals’ emancipation from the sovereign states, 
while others consider that the golden age of autonomy has passed. 
This paper studies the essence of the association dominated by NGOs 
and how this association affects individuals in international politics. 
This paper suggests that the ideal subject for NGOs is one with clear-
ly defined and precise goals and is isolated or compatible with other 
subjects lest drawing governments’ hostility. The idealized NGOs 
predominating over all fields may create enterprise association and 
also help to contribute to a closed international society. The voice of 
individuals will be silenced in enterprise association and closed so-
ciety. Therefore, NGOs should function objectively as subsidiary 
subjects of civil association. If NGOs intrude into the international 
political field, they will harm individuals. 
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The Rise of International Organizations in the Contemporary 
World 
International organizations have proliferated rapidly during the 
last century.  According to the database, Yearbook of International 
Organizations, in 1909 there were only thirty-seven intergovernmen-
tal organizations (IGOs) and 176 nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs).1  These numbers grew to 4,565 for IGOs and 23,635 for 
NGOs by 1991.2  By the year 2013, there were already 7,756 IGOs 
and 59,383 NGOs globally.3  Approximately 1,200 new organizations 
are added each year.4  
Robert Jordan, who was a distinguished professor of strategy and 
policy at the U.S. Naval War College and once served as director of 
research for the U.N. Institute for Training and Research, concluded 
that “concomitant with their growth, IGOs and INGOs have become 
increasingly significant actors in world politics”.5  Though it is too 
far to claim that the state is no longer the primary component in con-
temporary international politics, we cannot ignore the “alternative 
and possibly competitive foci of power and influence”6 caused by in-
ternational organizations.  Hiner Hanggi, Ralf Roloff, and Jurgen 
Ruland distinguished the five levels of international policy-making: 
global, inter/trans-regional, macro-regional, trans-border institutions 
at a sub-regional level, and bilateral state to state.7  International or-
ganizations have played critical roles in the first four levels.8  It is 
safe for us to conclude that the international political system now 
consists of three levels of subjects: nation-states through making bi-
lateral treaties,9 IGOs, and NGOs.10   
 
 1. THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORG. 2013-2014, Vol. 4, fig. 2.9 
(2015). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. ROBERT JORDAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
TO THE MANAGEMENT OF COOPERATION 20 (4th ed. 2001). 
 6. Id. at 39. 
 7. HINER HA ̈GGI ET AL., INTERREGIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Jürgen 
Rüland ed., Routledge 2006). 
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Though having much in common, IGOs and NGOs present di-
verse trends of development.  From 1981 to 1991, the number of 
IGOs had increased over threefold, while NGOs increased nearly 
80%.  Despite the tremendous growth of both, IGOs still had a much 
higher growth rate in the1980s.11  The 1990s saw a slowdown of 
IGOs, the growth rate of which fell to only 48%.12  While in the year 
2001, the number of NGOs amounted to nearly double compared to 
that of 1991, meaning the growth rate of NGOs keeps increasing and 
surpassing that of IGOs.13  Though the growth in the international or-
ganization has leveled off from 2001 to 2014, the rate of NGOs 
(26%) is still higher than IGOs (15%).14  Comparing the bilateral and 
multilateral treaties that played the most significant role in interna-
tional politics after the Second World War, IGOs and NGOs were 
most active in the 1980s.  More specifically, the period after the Cold 
War witnessed the prosperity of NGOs.  We can easily revise Mac-
dougal’s assertion back in 1966 that the Nineteenth Century is char-
acterized as the era of the nation-state and the Twentieth Century is 
considered the era of the intergovernmental organization, while pos-
terity may characterize our period as one of NGOs.15 
According to this trend, there are increasingly more people who 
believe that, with the assistance of NGOs, “the individual appears to 
occupy the central stage of international law.”16  “Never before, in the 
history of human kind, have people possessed so many rights and 
freedoms opposable to sovereign states.”17  Therefore, one could con-
clude that the contemporary world is experiencing “the renascent of 
the individual.”18 
 
9. The number of multilateral treaties, though, was only 10 percent of that of bilateral 
treaties, following the increasing trend.  However, it’s always hard to distinguish the 
simple multilateral treaties and international organizations. THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, 
supra note 1. 
 10. THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, supra note 1. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. EDUARDO SZAZI, NGOS: LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (Leiden 
Univ. Press 2012). 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. M.McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in 
R.FALK, THE FUTURE OF INT’L LEGAL ORDER 94 (PUP Princeton 1969).  
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Compared to sovereign states, NGOs have brought about a dif-
ferent kind of association that leads to the arising of new ways of 
governance in international politics—governance without a state, 
which marks the fading of modern statehood.19  Considering that “the 
tension between states’ rights and individual rights has become par-
ticularly difficult to solve in recent times,”20 the decline of modern 
statehood may lead the emancipation of individuals.21  In other 
words, the golden age of democracy may be coming to an end.  There 
are still some people that have an opposite position. For example, 
Richard Tuck, a professor at Harvard University, claims the golden 
age, which existed in the Seventeenth Century, has passed for good, 
which, though seemingly strange and ill-timed, perhaps still makes 
sense.22 
This paper will first briefly review the themes, discussions, and 
theories in international politics back to the Seventeenth and Nine-
teenth Century in order to present a historical prospect of internation-
al cooperation on the basic of this particular subject. Tracing this 
back will reveal how the areas and discussions are different between 
international politics based on states system in the past and NGOs in 
the contemporary world.  The distinct areas and discussions leading 
to different cooperation of individuals will be explained later.  
Through the analysis of the field and subject of NGOs, this paper 
takes a process of ascending from empirical data to concepts. The as-
cension here has two purposes.  First, it means to convert the analysis 
of empirical data to that of an ideal type. Second, it will analyze, the 
concrete established institution of NGOs to the pattern of governance 
they bring up. We assert that an NGO is a special medium of govern-
ance technique, which is still latent in contemporary international 
politics，and is already prepared to conquer this field actively.  Fi-
nally, we will see how this kind of governing is perverse to a healthy 
civil society open to individuals. 
Before we dive into analysis, there are still several preliminary 
comments that need to be clarified. This paper seeks to unfold the 
 
 19. THOMAS. RISSE, GOVERNANCE WITHOUT A STATE?: POLICIES AND POL. IN AREAS OF 
LIMITED STATEHOOD 276 (Columbia Univ. 2011). 
 20. DOMINIK ZAUM, LEGITIMATING INT’L ORG. 40 (Oxford Scholarship Online Jan. 2013, 
2014). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
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prospect of international politics influenced by NGOs from the per-
spective of political philosophy. Some concrete NGOs are not the ob-
jects of this paper.  This paper has an emphasis on international 
NGOs and politics but it also refers to domestic NGOs and politics. 
However, the conclusion can be applied to them as well.  If so, why 
does this paper deliberately focus on international NGOs?  When 
analyzing justice of a man, Socrates, in Plato’s work The Republic, 
turned to discuss with his friends about justice in the city-state.23 Be-
cause there would be more justice in the larger and it would be easier 
to observe closely.24 Socrates takes it as considering the issues of the 
larger as a way to address the issues of the smaller.25  Similarly, the 
situation of INGOs to international politics is very similar to the situ-
ation of NGOs in domestic politics.  Also in the international area, 
states are “larger” than the “smaller” individuals; therefore, stating a 
comparison of the individual to the state is a better reference when 
discussing NGOs. Besides, there is a moderate analysis of IGOs, but 
IGOs are not the issue of this paper. IGOs are introduced into this 
study as a transitional type between the state and NGO.26 By making 
a comparative analysis between IGOs and NGOs, the nature of NGOs 
becomes clearer. When the instrumental functions of IGOs are fully 
examined then the discussion on it will gradually disappear from the 
paper. 
International Politics Before the Twentieth Century.  
Richard Tuck concluded with slight pessimism at the end of his 
book, The Right of War and Peace, stating that “it is important that 
we are clear about what autonomy meant in the days when it became 
the central virtue, so that we can also be clear about what we may be 
losing in our own time.”27 Tuck attempted to guide his readers back 
to the Seventeenth Century after the Peace Treaty of Westphalia was 
 
 23. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 147 (T. E. Page et al. eds., Paul Shorey trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press rev. ed. 1937) (c. 380 B.C.E.). 
 24. Id. at 149. 
 25. Id. at 147-49. 
 26. THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, supra note 1. 
 27. RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHT OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 234 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
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signed in 1648.28 In the Westphalian system, the state is regarded as 
an organization that has the highest level of power or is the sovereign 
in its territory.29  This basic principle of autonomy helps form an in-
dependent political community.30  Due to economic interference, 
though extremely limited, and international norms, though weak, the 
ideal autonomy never existed during the Westphalian period.  How-
ever, as the states only “accepted very few international obligations 
in either conventional or customary law”, the states, as Mark Zacher 
mentioned, “maintained a high degree of policy autonomy by not 
enmeshing themselves in a large number of international regimes and 
especially not in a regime that restricted their ability to use military 
force.”31 
Natural right theorists conceive that sovereign states are subjects 
which behave like individuals.  Tuck pointed out that this kind of 
metaphor for the international arena is a near-perfect example of the 
operation of the fundamental principles of the natural right theorists.32 
Among them, Thomas Hobbes presented the most profound explana-
tion.  Hobbes, whose experience was colored by the British civil war 
in the 1640s, followed by his successors,33 proposed the concept of 
the state of nature, meant individuals lived close by without any kind 
of state sovereignty existing to explain the pre-civil world of hu-
mans.34  State of nature, though presumed to explain the relationship 
between individual men, acts as a metaphor to state of international 
relationship, and as Rousseau announced, “the Hobbesian ‘man’ was 
really a state all along, displaying characteristics that were usually 
encountered only in state, such as a constant and unforgiving striving 
for power.”35 
 
 28. GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 59 
(James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czemprel eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) [here-
inafter GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 60. 
 32. Tuck, supra note 27, at 9. 
 33. Id. at 135. 
 34. Id. at 140. 
 35. Id. at 230. 
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This concept, according to Charles Beitz, is assumed to be con-
structed by individuals without social connection.36  Similarly, inter-
national relations, to a certain extent, are an autonomous agent with-
out any effective relationships.37 The autonomy of the state in the 
Seventeenth Century lacked the sense of global civil society; there-
fore, the sovereign state in the Seventeenth Century is the best para-
digm for individuals lacking necessary social connection.38  In the 
state of nature, there is no public agreement about good and evil, 
which implies a lack of justice in law.39  The concept of states’ au-
tonomy was not understood as taking action following desires and in-
terests of states, but rather by policies and strategies in international 
affairs as they saw fit in a political environment that was similar to 
Israel in the period of Judges.40  Finally, because of competition, dif-
fidence, and glory, there is war of everyone against everyone41 in the 
state of nature.  Of course, this ideal concept, due to its highly ab-
stract style, failed to meet every situation and experience, but it is still 
applicable to explaining the international arena.  Hobbes asserts that 
though this typical state of nature never existed in history, stating, 
“yet in all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of 
their Independency, are in continually . . . a posture of war.”42 
For Hobbes, the war in state of nature is hard to bear — just 
think about this famous depiction in Leviathan:  
[T]here is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no 
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be import-
 
 36. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 42 (Princeton 
Univ. Press 1999).  
 37. Id. at 8. 
 38. Though it does not means that Hobbes ignores any social cooperation as Charles Beitz 
has claimed.  Noel Malcolm has clarified, “The general picture that emerges here is of 
cooperation and interaction between states, and between the subjects of states, taking 
place at many levels .  Hobbes’s account contains many of the ingredients of what 
modern theorists describe as an international society .  .”  NOEL MALCOLM, ASPECT OF 
HOBBES 452 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).  
 39. PATRICK DEVLIN, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS, 
181 (Oxford Univ. Press 1965). 
 40. Nir Kedar, Democracy and Judicial Autonomy in Israel’s Early Years, 15 ISRAEL 
STUDIES 25-46 (2010).  
 41. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88 (Richard Ruck ed., 1651). 
 42. Id. at 90. 
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ed by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of 
moving, and removing such things as require much force; no 
Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no 
Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, con-
tinual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.43 
Human beings would end either in self-destruction or escape to an-
other sovereign state.44  Since neither of these happened in the Seven-
teenth Century, Hobbes succeeded in setting up the presumption at 
the beginning, and failed at the end.45  Why does this happen?  Pro-
fessor Tuck quoted the opinion of Max Weber, who saw that overseas 
expansions was the certain unique and never repeating precondition 
of freedom and democracy,46 to imply the answer. Though vaguely 
asserted, Tuck’s answer could reasonably be speculated to imply, that 
the sustainability of supplies from new continents by overseas expan-
sions make the state of nature not extremely insupportable in a sys-
tem of international politics based on autonomy of state.47 
In the Nineteenth Century, along with the fading of providing 
new continents and the resources, the western world gradually orga-
nized a balanced system ruled by limited international law.48  The 
system of autonomy came under threat in Europe by Napoleon’s war 
of conquest and broke down into unbridled anarchy in the first few 
years in the Eighteenth Century.49  The arena of international politics 
is closer to the state of nature described by Hobbes.  It was far from 
bearable, so that a new system might be worked out to evolve.50  Un-
 
 43. Id. at 89.  
 44. Id. at 89-90.  
 45. Todd Calder, Hobbes’ Moral and Political Philosophy, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHIL. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/. 
 46. TUCK, supra note 27, at 15.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Congress of Vienna: the Forerunner of Multilateral Diplomacy, THE EXAMINER (Aug. 
7, 2010). 
http://www.examiner.com/article/congress-of-vienna-the-forerunner-of-multilateral-
diplomacy [hereinafter Congress of Vienna]. 
 49. Id.   
 50. Christoph Neusiedl, The Concept of Human Nature in International Relations-A Case 
Study of Realism and Liberalism, ACADEMIA.EDU 2-3 (2015), 
http://www.academia.edu/The_concept_of_human_nature_in_International_Relations
_a_case_study_of_realism_and_liberalism. 
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like practicing the solution proposed by Hobbes, in which individuals 
are persuaded to institute a sovereignty, world politics in the Nine-
teenth Century were marked by the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 
and the Hague Peace Conference in 1899, and have gradually 
evolved into a system constructed by laws of war, arbitration, and 
multilateral treaty.51  
Stephen Neff, a professor at University of Edinburgh, concluded 
that the Nineteenth Century was “an age of great achievement in in-
ternational law as in so many other walks of life.”52  The premise of 
the state of nature must be modified to fit because of the concern with 
the changes and development in international politics during that 
era.53  The appropriate theory was nothing new in the Nineteenth 
Century, as it had already been proposed by Samuel Pufendorf during 
the same period as Hobbes.54  
Despite some acknowledged basic principles, there is profound 
distinction between Pufendorf and Hobbes’ explanations of the state 
of nature.  The dividing consensus begs the question: could the state 
of nature be imagined as a human society?  Contradictory to Hobbes, 
who argued the commonwealths “should still continue in a State of 
mutual war” by lacking any emotional and ethical connection, Pufen-
dorf believed that the common sense of mankind was that “those 
Commonwealths, how distinct so ever” could be “allied by Friend-
ship and by Leagues.”55 Pufendorf’s theory on international affairs, 
especially the case in Germany “to reconstruct a decent and pacific 
life in Germany on the basis of precisely such alliances and leagues 
between states,”56 could invalidate Hobbesian Theory.57  In this kind 
of explanation, the state of nature “is so constituted that the race can-
not be preserved without social life.”58  Compared to the weak affilia-
tion of friendship, common interest plays a foundational role in build-
ing up a global society.   
 
 51. Congress of Vienna, supra note 48. 
 52. STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 
(Harvard Univ. Press 2014).   
 53. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 150 (London 1729).  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. TUCK, supra note 27, at 150. 
 57. Id. 
 58. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN 36 (1682). 
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Since 1815, many has been suggested the idea of “a global 
community interest.”59  In prophet-like tones, Pufendorf debated with 
Hobbes to defend a collective interest, “[a]lthough our moral lan-
guage thus reflects our interests, it does not directly reflect our per-
sonal interests, as Hobbes had thought; instead, if used properly, it 
always refers to whatever will in some way advance a collective in-
terest, or aid in the construction of patterns of social life.”60  A 
framework of international law, which helps to regulate and form the 
collective interest, could find its counterpart in the Pufendorf’s theory 
of natural law. This framework does not work in the state of nature in 
Hobbes’ explanation.  Though lacking the coercive power of the state 
to ensure the implementation, the law can still be “investigated by the 
light of reason61“. 
Professor Tuck criticized the theory of Pufendorf stating that it 
“had lost the sense of autonomous agents constructing their ethical 
environment.”62  The same anxiety could be inspired in global politics 
in the Nineteenth Century that the autonomy of the state might be to-
tally immersed by the new system.63  Comparing that situation to con-
temporary global politics, Professor Tuck’s criticism is only partially 
correct.  The operation of reason in theories of international law in 
the Nineteenth Century was restricted by a limited target: for peace 
among states in theory, to prevent any hegemony on the continent, 
and to avoid a pan-European war.64 If peace is the main goal, reason 
in international politics of the Nineteenth Century is nothing less than 
ability for rational discourse.  Diverse states are considered to be the 
foundation and the logical assumption of rational discourse in inter-
national politics, the system of international politics in the Nineteenth 
Century was also constituted by sovereign states.65   
This new system, established by the peacemakers from 1814-
181566 and sharing characteristics similar to hierarchy and anarchy, 
 
 59. GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 28, at 56. 
 60. TUCK, supra note 27, at 149. 
 61. PUFENDORF, supra note 58, at 37. 
 62. TUCK, supra note 27, at 230. 
 63. Id. 
 64. GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 28, at 38.  
 65. Id. at 38.  
 66. Id. at 38.  
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developed, changed, oscillated,67 decayed, and ultimately collapsed at 
the breakout of World War I.68 This still leaves a lot of legacy for 
contemporary international law. 
A Comparative Analysis to State, IGO and NGO by Type. 
The Nineteenth Century is still viewed as the era of the nation-
state, even though there was an increase in international law.69 In the 
Twentieth Century, the advancement of the international political 
system of nation-states was confined by a persistent increase in the 
number of international treaties. There were 6,351 bilateral treaties 
entered into force between 1945 and 1955.70  After two decades the 
number doubled again, amounting to 14,061 between 1966 and 
1975.71   
Despite of the decay of the Westphalian system, the state is still 
“the primary political unit in the composition of the contemporary in-
ternational system.”72  The system of nation-states, though saturated 
with a great variety of formal and informal international rules, is by 
no means removing its nucleus of autonomy or sovereignty.  Realism 
theoretical paradigm, which presumed that the primary motive of the 
warring states in international affairs was to constantly compete for 
territorial, material, and human resources，always reiterated by 
scholars on the insight of this nucleus.73  When international affairs 
get involved in intense state interests, the model of the state of nature 
proposed by Hobbes never fails in explaining the events.74  As James 
Yunker suggested, “modern history also seems to suggest that the 
 
 67. Id. at 32. 
 68. NEFF, supra note 52, at 219. 
 69. To the point of Reinhard (2007), “Even in Europe, the birthplace of modern statehood, 
nation-state were only able to fully establish the monopoly over the use of force in 
Nineteenth Century.”  RISSE, supra note 19, at 6  
 70. GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, surpa note 28, at 66. 
 71. Id. (Database comes from PETER ROHN, ROHN’S WORLD TREATY INDEX: VOLUME I 
(1997), and MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS (Bowman & Har-
ris eds., London: Butterworths 1984)).  
 72. GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, surpa note 28, at 100. 
 73. César de Prado, Global Multi-Level Governance: European and East Asian Leader-
ship, United Nations Univ. Press 219 (2007), 
http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/samplechapters/multilevel. 
Governance_dePrado_UNUPress_chapter.pdf.  
 74. TUCK, supra note 27. 
3 POTENTIAL IMPACTS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:37 PM 
Potential Impacts on Individuals  Vol. IV, No. I 
93 
sovereign nation-state system possess a strong propensity toward the 
generation of hostility, conflict and warfare among nations.75 
Though states could draft bilateral treaties to regular their behav-
iors, it still could not be a persuasive reason to reject Hobbes’s theo-
ry, for Hobbes himself never denied the possibilities of the coopera-
tion of states.76  He even believed that there could be high levels of 
cooperation in international politics.77  Hobbes’s attitude on interna-
tional trade and cooperation is the best example.  “[I]nternational 
trade, in Hobbes’s view, was essential for the well-being of a com-
monwealth … He recognized that trade required a system of com-
mercial law … The general picture that emerges here is of coopera-
tion and interaction between states.”78  Without a coercive force to 
enforce the obligations, the goals of treaties could only be reached by 
chance.79 The goals always fail in vain by their weakness.80  In the 
background of globalization, this system of the states is believed to 
be an obstacle to permanent and stable cooperation in international 
society.  As D. Grewal argued, “[e]verything is being globalized ex-
cept politics.”81 
Compared to the chaos brought about by the states, IGOs indi-
cate the real systems that take supranational organizations as their 
center. These organizations have the capacity to interfere and regulate 
the states’ actions in some specific aspects.82  In an idealistic IGO, 
states have the right to participate in policy-making, and their in-
volvement within the IGO is limited.83  The essential boundary of 
each state remains intact in this structure.  In other words, states are 
integrated organically without being deprived of their nature.  
 
 75. James A. Yunker, Beyond Global Governance: Prospects for Global Government, 
INT’L J. ON WORLD PEACE, Vol. XXVI No.2, June 2009. 
 76. THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZENS 29 (Raymond Geuss & Quentin Skinner eds., 
1998). 
 77. TUCK, supra note 27. 
 78. NOEL MALCOLM, ASPECT OF HOBBES 452 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).  
 79. ON THE CITIZENS, supra note 76. 
 80. LEVIATHAN, supra note 41. 
 81. DAVID GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 50 
(Yale University Press 2008). 
 82. International Government Organizations (IGOs), HARV. L. SCH. (2015),  
http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interest-law/public-international-
law/intergovernmental-organizations-igos/.   
 83. Id. 
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The Yearbook of International Organizations has distinguished 
fifteen different types of international organizations applying to both 
IGOs and NGOs:  
A. federations of international organizations; B. universal 
membership organizations; C. intercontinental membership 
organizations; D. regionally oriented membership organiza-
tions; E. organizations emanating from places, persons, and 
bodies; F. organizations of special form, G. internationally 
oriented national organizations; H. dissolved or apparently 
inactive organizations; J. recently reported bodies – not yet 
confirmed; K. subsidiary and internal bodies; N. national 
organizations; R. religious orders and secular institutes; S. 
autonomous conference series; T. multilateral treaties and 
intergovernmental agreements; and U. currently inactive 
nonconventional bodies.84   
Unsurprisingly, in the Twentieth Century, T type IGOs, 2,172 
out of 3,865,85 are the largest classification of currently active IGOs.86  
This phenomenon had not changed by 2013, during which time 2,406 
T type IGOs existed out87 of 5,002 IGOs.88  In all the types of IGOs, 
multilateral treaties and intergovernmental agreements, which can 
never exist as a real type of NGOs, are most closely related to bilat-
eral treaties, which could only be regarded as the typical international 
cooperation among sovereign states.89 In this sense, although the mul-
tilateral treaties and intergovernmental agreements cannot be identi-
fied with the bilateral treaties, the structure of IGOs did not move too 
far from the system of the sovereign state. 
 
 84. THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, Types of International Organization, UNION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, http://www.uia.org/archive/types-organization/toy 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 85. The number “3865” comes from total number of IGOs in 20th Century (5725) by de-
ducing the number of type H (639) and U (1221). THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, supra 
note 1, fig. 2.9.  
 86. Id.   
 87. The number “5002” comes from total number of IGOs by the year 2013 (7756) by de-
ducing the number of type H (801) and U (1953) Id.   
 88. Id.   
 89. Thomas Miles & Erica Posner, Which States Enter Into Treaties and Why?, UNIV. OF 
CHI. L. SCH. (2008), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/420.pdf. 
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Due to the new global crisis and problems, new types of actors 
are nurtured to give response to them.90  Global environmental issues 
have “provided new opportunities for civil society actors to address 
problems which the geographically delimited states may be inade-
quate to address.”91  As Thomas Davies concluded “the inability of 
states effectively to deal with transnational environment problems 
may have led to the development of an alternative world civic politics 
to deal with these issues that may bypass state institutions altogeth-
er.”92  Similarly to environment, other areas are on the attack of glob-
alization.93  As a result, there is a strong need for new kind of actors 
in international human society to overcome the boundaries of the 
states.  If as generally suggested, international organizations have 
presented the trend of gradually growing of “the broadening power 
and influence of international actors extending beyond the sovereign 
state system,”94 then NGO is the culmination in bypassing states’ 
boundaries.95  
According to the Yearbook, NGOs in type G (internationally ori-
ented national organizations) account for 98.14% of all international 
organizations in this type, the ratio of which is at the peak among all 
types.96  However, two types are excluded, national organizations and 
religious orders and secular institutes, which account for 99.94% and 
100% respectively.  These two types contradict the nature and defini-
tion of IGOs, which makes the comparative study invalid and is much 
higher than the average.97  All international organizations in Type G 
have an international origination.98  If an organization can ignore the 
national elements in its origination, it is more independent from 
 
 90. Michael Edwards, David Hulme, & Tina Wallace, NGOs In a Global Future: Marry-
ing Local Delivery to Worldwide Leverage, GLOBAL DEV. RES. CENTER, 
http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/g-future.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2016). 
 91. THOMAS DAVIES, NGOS: A NEW HISTORY OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIETY 177 (2014). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Edwards, Hulme, & Wallace, supra note 90. 
 94. ROBERT JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE 
MANAGEMENT OF COOPERATION 20 (4th ed. 2001).  
 95. Samuel Worthington, The Role of U.S. NGOs in Global Development and Humanitar-
ian Work, INTERACTION,  
http://www.interaction.org/files/FABB%202013_Sec01_PolicyPaper_RoleOfNGOs.p
df (last visited Jan. 9, 2016). 
 96. THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, supra note 1. 
 97. Id.   
 98. Id.  
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states.99  Therefore, compared with IGOs, NGOs are more independ-
ent and have a greater tendency in bypassing states’ boundaries, 
which meets the inference from the nature of NGOs. 
 A Comparative Analysis of Distribution of NGOs, IGOs and 
States by Subjects. 
Within its territory, a state can acquire its legitimate sovereign 
power.  Through this power, people are organized and obliged to 
obey the rules legitimated by the government and keep their fidelity 
towards sovereignty.100  However, NGOs, especially international 
NGOs, are not confined by the boundaries of the states and cannot be 
categorized as domestic agencies.101  The association created by 
NGOs is thoroughly different from civil association supported by 
states.  Due to the special structure， NGO is not compatible with 
any kind of association.  The NGO has a particular pattern of associa-
tion.  In fact, NGOs can be viewed as mediums of a specific associa-
tion.  The next problem is how can we reveal the characteristics of 
this association?   
A. Where Our Analysis will Begin.   
The first thing we need to understand is that the pattern of this 
association is very fragile and easily distorted and even covered by 
impacts of other kinds of association or force.102  However, there are 
some clues left through which the characteristics of the association 
can be brought to light.  The most obvious clue is the areas that are 
easy for NGOs to thrive in or subjects they are prone to operate on 
mostly.103 If relatively large amounts of NGOs gather in some specif-
ic areas, the technique of governance on these subjects may best fit 
 
 99. Id.  
 100. Authority and Legitimacy, ROUTLEDGE TAYLOR & FRANCIS GROUP, 
http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/alevelphilosophy/data/AS/WhyShouldIBeGoverned
/Authorityandlegitimacy.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2016). 
 101. Peter Willetts, What is a Non-Governmental Organization?, CITY UNIV., LONDON 
(http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/peter-willets.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2016). 
 102. DOROTHEA BAUR, NGOS AS LEGITIMATE PARTNERS OF CORPORATIONS: A POLITICAL 
CONCEPTUALIZATION 127 (2011). 
 103. Id. 
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the nature of NGOs.104 The pattern of association is revealed through 
analyzing the technique of governance on these subjects. 
There are two elements that contribute to forming the associa-
tion: the subject people deal with and how the people deal with it.105 
For example, Cicero, the great politician in ancient Rome, defined a 
republic as “a numerous gathering brought together by legal consent 
and community of interest.”106  Therefore, the main subject that the 
people pursue in a republic is common interest.  People are defined as 
“being not every assemblage or mob.”  Saint Augustine, Bishop of 
Hippo, concluded that the wealth of the people “exists only when it is 
well and justly governed.”107  In this case, justice is the way the peo-
ple must work with their subject in a republic.108   
While justice and governance are independent of each other, they 
always correspond.109  For example, if a group of people wants to op-
erate an enterprise, they need to work efficiently.  While they strive 
for their common interests as a republic, they must do it justly.110  
Even though how people govern has a closer relationship with the 
pattern of the association, the subjects they deal with are more easily 
discerned by empirical studies.  Then it is more reasonable for us to 
examine the subject of NGOs.  From the Seventeenth Century to the 
Nineteenth Century, war and peace remain the main subjects in inter-
national politics.111  As a result, despite the diverse structure between 
the Westphalian system and the states system regulated by interna-
tional law, the participants in international politics always legalize 
their actions through the claims of justice.112  However, the modern 
issues are distributed much more widely than before.  This paper first 
 
 104. DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN CRISES THROUGH 
NGOS 18, 21 (2009). 
 105. Peace Corps, The Role of NGOs in a Civil Society, 
http://files.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/library/M0070_mod1.pdf (last visited Jan. 
9, 2016). 
 106. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE REPUBLIC 19 (Niall Rudd trans., 1998). 
 107. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 76 (1887). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. COLIN S. GRAY, WAR, PEACE AND INT’L RELATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC 
HISTORY 1 (2007). 
 112. Hedley Bull, Order vs. Justice In Int’l Society, 19 POL. STUD. 269-83 (1971), 
http://press.anu.edu.au/sdsc/hedley/mobile_devices/ch08.html.  
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analyzes the distribution of NGOs by subjects and makes a compara-
tive analysis to IGOs, in order to reveal the pattern of the association 
brought up by NGOs. 
B. Distribution of International Organization by Subjects.  
According to “The Number of International Organizations by 
Subject of Activity” of the Yearbook of International Organizations, 
the amount of NGOs are distributed homogeneously by the subjects 
of their activities.113  One may claim that it is because of the different 
saturation points of international activities by international organiza-
tions in diverse areas.114  The distribution of the number of IGOs is 
not the same with that of NGOs, where IGOs are also categorized as 
international organizations and implement international activities in 
all areas where NGOs are involved.115  The diverse state of distribu-
tion by subjects between NGOs and IGOs is probably caused by their 
different natures.  Considering this, the analysis takes IGOs as a me-
dium, and only uses the data of the amounts of activities of IGOs by 
subjects as reference to analyze that of NGOs.116  The figure below 











 113. THE UNION OF INT’L ASS’N, NUMBER OF INT’L ORG. BY SUBJECT OF ACTIVITY, 51 
YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS. 175, Fig. 5.3 (2014) [hereinafter YEARBOOK OF INT’L 
ORGS]. 
 114. Id. 
 115. In this paper, the terms “subject” and “area” are synonymous.  However, it does not 
mean there is no difference between the two.  The term “area” places particular em-
phasis on the nature of matter.  It concerns objects.  While the notion of “subject” has 
direct relationship with active actors—people.  It emphasizes people in specific situa-
tions participating in the formation of a subject in a particular area.  Generally speak-
ing, “subject” and “area” are two different aspects of the same thing.  See YEARBOOK 
OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113.  
 116. YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113. 
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The original data and categories come from the Yearbook of In-
ternational Organizations, the statistics were collected in 2013.117  
The fifth and tenth rows show the amount of NGOs’ activities divid-
ed by that of IGOs’ according to various subjects (N/I).118  All data in 
this figure is arrayed from high to low according to this index.119  Fi-
nally, the fourth and ninth rows are the total amounts of all interna-
tional organizations’ actions.  The third and eighth rows indicate the 
original numbers in the Yearbook.120 
Concerning all subjects of actions, the grand total of NGOs is 4.5 
times greater than that of IGOs.121  All data of N/I from left line is 
 
 117. YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113, figs.5.1, 5.3. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
No. Subjects Above 4.5) ON TA N/I No. Subjects  
(Below 4.5) 
ON TA N/I 
1 Religious Practice 36 1951 282.43 16 Management 42 1894 4.27 
2 Health Care 32 4601 12.45 17 Cooperation 82 1755 2.77 
3 Education 33 5675 10.90 18 Finance 27 5061 2.08 
4 Employment 22 8634 7.80 19 Transporta-
tion Tech 
25 3604 1.90 
5 Society (Element) 21 6255 7.17 20 Law 39 3534 1.88 
6 Production 28 4225 6.83 21 Defence  
(Police)* 
35 877 1.30 
7 Culture 54 1745 6.83 22 Government 
(Politics) 
37 2597 1.12 
8 Science 51 1582 6.72 23 Environment 49 3780 0.41 
9 Research Standard 31 7208 6.61      
10 Conservation 69 2236 5.82      
11 Amenities (Necessities) 24 1894 5.76      
12 Technology 48 1921 5.24      
13 International Relations 59 1637 5.09      
14 Development 60 4792 4.85      
15 Information 23 2403 4.55      
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higher than the average (High), while that of right line is below the 
average (Low).  In order to reduce contingency, the total amounts 
under 1,000 are not taken into consideration (except for defense, for 
it is traditional subjects in international politics).122  Amounts above 
3,000 can be categorized as high and those between 1,000 and 3,000 
as low.  The figure below concludes this section: 
Clearly, NGOs frequently get involved in subjects like medicine, 
health care, and education, for both the index of N/I and the total  
 
amount of organizations are high.123  In contrast, they are least active 
in areas like defense and government, which are low in both N/I and 
the total.  For some subjects of this category, the number of IGOs is 
very close to or even higher than that of NGOs.  For example, there 
are 1,227 IGOs working on the subject of Government, which is ap-
proaching the number NGOs, estimated to be 1,370.124  Comparative-
ly, IGOs fit better in areas like Environment and Finance.  While 
there are large amounts of IGOs active on these subjects, the NGOs 
seldom work on them.  The subjects with high N/I statistics and low 
totals are difficult to analyze.  This is because the comparative ad-
vantage that NGOs have over IGOs on these subjects is highly inter-
fered with by the naturally low saturation of international organiza-
tions. 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113. 
 124. Id. 
 Total Amount  
(High Above 3000) 
Total Amount  
(Low 1000-3000) 
NGOs / IGOs  






NGOs / IGOs  
(Low Below Avg.) 
Environment/Finance Defence/Government 
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C. The First Explanation—State Interests.  
What factor causes this diverse distribution of international or-
ganizations by subjects?  One reasonable explanation is state inter-
ests.  Thomas Davies, a professor at City University London, discov-
ered this factor when analyzing the ascent and decline of the 
NGOs.125  He had traced back the three waves of “transnational civil 
society:” the mid-Nineteenth Century to the outset of the Twentieth 
Century, the end of World War I to the 1920s, and the second half of 
the Twentieth Century to the outset of the new millennium.126  Each 
wave had witnessed a period of great expansion in varieties and 
numbers of NGOs with their proponents claiming to speak for “the 
most representative forces of the different countries” in the period be-
fore World War I, the “public opinion of the world” in the period 
preceding World War II or “global civil society” in the period pre-
ceding the September 11, 2001 attacks,127 but finally ended with the 
demise of transnational civil society.128  Davies analyzed some factors 
that affect the demise, including “Scientific/Technological, Environ-
mental, Economic, Social, External Politics, and Internal Politics.”129  
All of these factors are believed to be double-edged swords, which 
could both facilitate and deter the development of NGOs.130  The 
trend of detriment is always brought by factions and illiberal actors, 
and is always accompanied by exhaustion.   
What contributes to fragmentation of the international civil soci-
ety, promoted by NGOs?  Divisive trends always originate from areas 
and issues involving high state interests, such as disarmament in the 
1930s and substitution for the welfare roles of fragile states in the 
post-Cold War era.131  If these areas and issues are preoccupied by 
nationalism, as in the late Nineteenth Century, NGOs could stop act-
ing on behalf of world public opinion.  According to Davies, it is na-
tionalism – not the inner problem of the NGO – that operates only on 
behalf of the sovereign state, narrows its prospect of interest within 
the national boundaries, and devastates the prospect of the reviving of 
 
 125. DAVIES, supra note 91, at 180. 
 126. Id. at 177-78. 
 127. Id. at 181. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 9.  
 130. DAVIES, supra note 91, 12-13. 
 131. Id. at 175.  
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individuals.132  He complains “the leadership of INGOs and transna-
tional coalitions of INGOs should avoid claims to speak on behalf of 
the public opinion of the world or global civil society, when such or-
ganizations have only ever represented a segment of the world’s pop-
ulation.”133 
Davies’s theory can also explain the case of diverse distribution 
of NGO by subject.  It is easy to infer from Davies’s point of view 
that NGOs could be expected to thrive on subjects, or in fields, in-
volved with low state interest.  Some NGOs widely distribute on sub-
jects like medicine, healthcare, and education, and are considered as 
fields involved with lower state interests.  Economic areas are in-
volved with higher state interest.  There are relatively fewer NGOs, 
but IGOs are more vigorous in the fields mentioned above.134  Gov-
ernment, defense, and military are identified with fields within in-
tense state interest, in which NGOs struggle to survive, while IGOs 
adapt better.135  
Further analysis supports this suggestion.  In fields of structure 
and context social action which government and defense belong to, 
the number of type G NGOs (Internationally oriented national organ-
izations) and N (National organizations), which are influenced by the 
strong boundaries of the states, are more than that of Type E,136 in 
which the structure of the sovereign state tends to be ignored.137  
While in cosmosphere/geosphere and biosphere which contain medi-
cine and bio-science, the situation is completely the opposite.138  We 
can safely conclude that when approaching the pole of medicine and 
biosphere with or without low involving state interests, the influence 
by boundaries of the states to NGOs gradually weaken.139  While get-
ting close to the opposite—fields involved with the most intensive 
 
 132. Id.   
 133. Id, at 181-82.  
 134. Id, at 91-92.  
 135. Id, at 11-12.  
 136. YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113, fig. 5.6, at 175. Type E refers to organiza-
tions emanating from places, persons, bodies. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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state interests—the structure of states tend to acquire an increasing 
impact on international cooperation.140  
Though having type difference with NGOs, the distribution ten-
dency of IGOs is similar.  In fields involving the most intensive state 
interests, multilateral treaties and intergovernmental agreements con-
stitute the majority of IGOs.141  For example, IGOs of Type T account 
for 7,133 out of 13,980 of the total in fields of structure and context 
social action.142  Compared to other types, Type T is closer to bilat-
eral treaties reached by states.143  So in areas involved with high state 
interests, where it is hard for NGOs to survive, the structure of IGOs 
is most similar to the system of sovereignty of states. 
We could discover a spectrum of fields ranging from intense 
state interest to low state interest.144  This spectrum expands from ar-
eas of defense, military, government, and other vital interests con-
cerning the sovereign of the state at one pole, to fields like finance 
and environment in the middle, then to the areas with low or without 
state interest, such as medicine, health care and education at the op-
posite.145  The first level fields close to the pole involving intense 
state interest could be hard for international organizations to survive.  
They mainly are the stages of the sovereign states.  The finance and 
environment in the middle level are environmentally friendly to 
IGOs.146   NGOs act most vigorously in the third level.147   
If we make a narrow standard to classify the degree of interna-
tional cooperation by its efficiency, the system of the sovereign states 
without doubt has the lowest success ratio and efficiency for coopera-
tion.  When the nucleus of autonomy is still possessed by the states, 
the system of the states always exists as a Hobbesian state of nature.  
If we see the boundaries of the states as the obstacle for international 
cooperation, the external environment for idealistic NGOs will avoid 
the boundaries of the states and dwell in the third level where NGOs 
could act uniformly without segmenting themselves and acquire the 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORGS, supra note 113. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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highest degree of cooperation.  The spectrum discussed here is shown 
















States IGOs NGOs 
Degree of  
Cooperation 
Low Medium High 
 
While at the one pole, the chaos sphere of Hobbesian state of na-
ture hangs over the international cooperation; the opposite presents a 
clear profile of human society.  Accompanied by the higher degree of 
cooperation promoted by NGOs, the global human society, consisted 
of institutions that “straddle the whole earth, and have complex ef-
fects that are felt in its four corners,”148 though may still be a “pro-
ject” or an “aspiration” rather than an empirically observable phe-
nomenon,149 is already on the agenda instead of only dwelling in the 
human mind.  The prospect of this kind of global human society 
which is believed to be founded by NGOs through representing the 
public claims150 seems to be much closer to the other prospect of the 
state of nature proposed by Pufendorf, who considered the state of 
nature as a human society created through common wealth.  Howev-
er, this analogy has finally proved to be a misunderstanding.151 
In the background of globalization, common wealth—which is 
redefined under the name of “public good” by economists—”stands 
at the end of a chain stretching from local street cleaning to national 
defense and environmental protection to global warming.”152  Pedro 
 
 148. JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY? 8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). 
 149. DAVIES, supra note 91, at 8. 
 150. DOROTHEA BAUR, NGOS AS LEGITIMATE PARTNERS OF CORPORATIONS: A POLITICAL 
CONCEPTUALIZATION 5 (2011). 
 151. Id. at 6.  
 152. INGE KAUL, ET AL., PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION 
xiv (Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
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Conceição listed several leading “Global Public Goods” including in-
ternational financial stability, multilateral trade regime, global com-
munications network and the internet, communicable disease control, 
reducing the excessive disease burden, climate stability, and peace 
and security.153 Among them, peace, which acts, as the sole common 
wealth in Pufendorf’s theory, is just one category of these series of 
“Global Public Good.”154  However, NGOs are active in providing the 
rest of “Global Public Good,” which is especially true since the crisis 
of world war was lightened after the cold war.155  These kinds of 
common wealth were foreign to international areas in the Nineteenth 
Century and also, of course, much harder for Pufendorf to prophesize 
at his time.156   
D. Amendment to the First Explanation—Complexity and 
Abstractness. 
It is important to make clear the relationship of the diverse sub-
jects of common wealth discussed by Pufendorf on international so-
ciety, and modern scholars on the “Global Public Good” or benefits 
to globalization promoted by NGOS.  In other words, what is the real 
difference between peace/war and other subjects?  Does the former 
simply identify with an area involved with intense state interest?  It is 
clear that the positive answer fails to meet any situation.157  For ex-
ample, health of individuals could be one of the most important for 
public good.  The area of medicine was supposed to get involved 
with intense state interests and is not environmentally friendly for 
NGOs.158  However, this is not the case according to the Yearbook of 
International Organizations. It states that there were 4,765 NGOs op-
erating in the fields of medicine by 2013, which is 26.5 times greater 
than the number of IGOs in the same area.  It is well above the aver-
 
 153. Id., at 156. 
 154. Compare PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION xiv (Inge 
Kaul et al. eds., 2003) with SAMUEL FREIHERR VON PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF 
MAN: ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE BOOK II 255 (1698).   
 155. INGE KAUL, ET AL., supra note 152, at 202. 
 156. Id. at 206. 
 157. WORLD HEALTH ORG., MEASURING MEDICINE PRICES, AVAILABILITY, AFFORDABILITY 
AND PRICE COMPONENTS xi (4th ed. 2008), 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/access/OMS_Medicine_prices.pdf.  
 158. Id. at 1-2. 
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age ratio.159  This means that, though having great correlation with 
commonwealth, the field of medicine is still extremely environmen-
tally friendly to NGOs, which is a contradiction to our inference.160  
This example weakens the assumption suggested above, which makes 
it necessary to examine the premise underlining this assumption. 
This assumption measures state interests merely according to 
their quantity.  If the state interests were reckoned only by quantita-
tive aspects, then the degree of it can just be measured and leveled by 
the possible devotion or deprivation for common wealth created by 
the actions of international organizations.161  When analyzing indi-
viduals’ interest interpreted as pleasure, John Mill complained, “[i]t 
would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is 
considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be 
supposed to depend on quantity alone.”162  Quantity alone is not suf-
ficient to measure state interests, quality should be taken into account 
as well.  This means that the diverse areas and subjects NGOs operate 
on can be distinguished from others by state interests of quantity as 
well as quality.163     
What is the meaning of “quality” here?  Pertaining to subjects 
themselves, quality can mean non-reductive and incommensurable 
values of different public good in diverse areas.164  Based on this 
premise, John Mill claimed that it might change the question of who 
is the best judge to evaluate his own pleasure “in their opportunities 
 
 159. Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, UNION OF INT’L 
ASS’N 180 (2014), 
http://www.uia.org/sites/uia.org/files/misc_pdfs/stats/Number_of_international_organi
zations_by_subject_of_activity_2013.pdf. 
 160. Compare WORLD HEALTH ORG., MEASURING MEDICINE PRICES, AVAILABILITY, 
AFFORDABILITY AND PRICE COMPONENTS xi (4th ed. 2008), 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/access/OMS_Medicine_prices.pdf, with Number 
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of experience,” instead of answering how to measure individuals’ in-
terests or “pleasure” directly in his own term.165   
Herbert Spencer once made an explanation of it, which could 
apply to demonstrate the relationship of the sovereign state to its own 
interests as well:  
To have complete felicity is to have all the faculties exerted 
in the ratio of their several developments . . . but the minds 
of no two individuals contain the same combination of ele-
ments.  Duplicate men are not to be found.  There is in each 
a different balance of desires.  The conditions adapted for 
the highest enjoyment of one, would not perfectly compass 
the same end for any other.  And consequently the notion of 
happiness must vary with the disposition and character; that 
is, must vary indefinitely.166  
Likewise, in a complex situation, which means promoting inter-
ests in one area could lead to a deficit in the other area, only the sov-
ereign state itself is best to measure its interests for there are no two 
countries that are duplicate in their level of development and the 
preference of their citizens.167  For example, environmental rights 
could be exalted in a materially prosperous and highly developed 
modern state.168  While in an impoverished town, citizens would need 
to exhaust the resources of the forest nearby to compensate for short-
age of the necessity.169  This is why the “West supported environmen-
tal NGOs gaining access to the Earth Summit” always confront the 
hostility “from developing country governments, who were worried 
that environment issues might become constrains upon develop-
ment.”170  Then there is no general principle to measure best interests 
of states.  Other than “how to evaluate the state interests,” the real 
 
 165. Id.  
 166. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS; OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HAPPINESS 
SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED 15-16 (1873). 
 167. Id. at 319. 
 168. A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental Rule of Law Litigation (2000 Garrison 
Lecture), 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 575, 597 (2002), 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/5. 
 169. Id. at 598. 
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problem is “who is most capable to evaluate them.”171  Only the state 
can measure which is best for its citizens through its sovereign.   
In many fields of international politics, “benefiting regions may 
not coincide with political boundaries.”172  Regional goals, according 
to optimal disposition of world systems to achieve highest effective-
ness are far from fitting the states’ best interests according its own 
reckoning. In some areas, states tend to claim sovereignty on policy 
and development project making according to their best benefit.173  
So government always hinders actions of NGOs in these areas.  We 
can attribute subjects like social problems, economy, and even mili-
tary and territory to these complex fields.  However, when promoting 
benefits in some areas can be compatible with others fields and also 
easily absorbed into the states’ development plan, sovereign states 
tend to stop acting as obstacles to NGOs.174  Contrary to complex 
ones, these areas can be characterized by abstractness.  As the com-
plexity goes down towards abstractness, the subjects become more 
available and environmentally friendly to NGOs.175 
E. The Second Explanation—Clarity of Goals. 
Robert Jordan has discovered that “most INGOs pursue particu-
lar interests, their foremost task is the attainment of specific goals for 
promotion of their interests.”176  However, definite goals do not only 
depend on the choices of INGOs.  They also relate to the degree of 
difficulty of forming clarity of goals in international perspective nur-
tured by specific fields.   If the subject of a specific field cannot pro-
vide NGOs with clear goals by its nature, this field is not good soil 
for NGOs.177  Referring to areas like defense and military in interna-
tional politics, there is no real common goal among states except self-
preservation.178  Of course, states also could have shared values in 
 
 171. SPENCER, supra note 166, at 320.  
 172. INGE KAUL, ET AL., supra note 152, at xiv-xv. 
 173. Id. at 127. 
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 176. ROBERT JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE 
MANAGEMENT OF COOPERATION 34 (Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication 
Data, 4th ed. 2001). 
 177. R.K. GUPTA, NGO’S AND GLOBAL POLICY (Mahaveer & Sons, 2009).  
 178. LEVIATHAN, supra note 41, at Ch. 13. 
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these fields and cooperated as military alliances.  But, it is not suffi-
cient for them to “eliminate all other causes of war.”179 Because the 
states “should rather, first, make a league against their enemies (re-
bellion) and afterwards, fight against one another.”180 Compared to 
some weak bind by shared values, self-preservation is more essential 
to the international relationship.  Hobbes has clearly illustrated that 
self-preservation, as a special common wealth. is by no means con-
sidered a fixed goal.181  In the state of nature, self-preservation could 
expand and permeate into any kind of concrete goal.  As a permanent 
and stable relationship among its members, NGOs prefer the fields 
that could provide goals precisely defined by their nature rather than 
by chance.182   
What’s more, defense and military lie in “a site of justice,”183 
which is a stage full of moral language, good or evil, just and unjust.  
Every state cannot fail in equipping itself with good and just to legis-
late its action.  Then these subjects cast the actors back to the state of 
nature.  When analyzing the defects of the state of nature, John Locke 
pointed out that “there wants a known and indifferent judge, with au-
thority to determine all differences according to the established 
law.”184 Without this kind of judge, only diverse subjects which “or-
der their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as 
they think fit”185 exist.  These areas are kept untouched for sovereign 
state in Hobbes’ century.  Even today, sovereign states seek coopera-
tion with each other in the form of temporary Strategic Partner or in-
stituting a Dispute-Resolving Mechanism.  As a result, the influence 
of NGOs which pursue common good that transcends states’ interest, 
is rejected in these areas. 
Distinct from “site of justice,” fields like medicine, health care, 
education, etc. can inspire NGO operations to form clear, defined, 
and precise goals, contradictory to vague, diffuse, and relatively un-
 
 179. NOEL MALCOLM, ASPECT OF HOBBES 455 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002). 
 180. THOMAS HOBBES, BEHEMOTH 144 (The Univ. of Chicago Press 1990). 
 181. LEVIATHAN, supra note 41, Ch. 14. 
 182. R.K. GUPTA, supra note 177. 
 183. Michel Foucault first used this term to indicate the market in the middle ages and the 
16th and 17th Century. The politics, of course, is a typical site of justice. MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, 30 (Palgrave Macmillan 2008). 
 184. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 125. 
 185. Id. at Chapter 2. 4. 
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specified goals.186  These subjects are not identified with ones having 
only a sole primary goal, because NGOs in these fields can have 
many primary goals, but still operate abstractly with clearly defined 
multi-goals.   Areas like education, health, and science,187 which tend 
to help NGOs operate on them to form clearly defined and precise 
goals, are favored for NGOs to prosper.  
Some areas like environment and social problems, though they 
could not always escape from contradicting other areas’ goals of de-
velopment, can still provide relatively precise goals for NGOs.  Des-
pise some resistance, NGOs also thrive in these areas.  A well-
organized market is still “a site of justice.”188  Because it creates 
competitive relations among various subjects, and rejects any unified 
goal, in general sense, for its participants.  However, when a unified 
global market is still in development, establishing it is a great project, 
which can provide clearly defined goal for NGOs.  Establishing a 
global market is one of the most significant goals after the Cold War, 
it is not surprising that the number of INGOs that operate in areas of 
major economic concern have generally grown more rapidly than the 
number of those that are concerned with essentially noneconomic 
matters.189 
We can categorize some typical areas with clarity of the “Goals 




Typical Areas Goals of Subjects 
1 Science/Technology Clearly defined, Precise 
2 Environment and Social Prob-
lem 
Relatively Precise 
3 Economy and Commerce Unspecified in Economic 
 




187. According to a document in 1973, NGOs’ Goal Type is categorized as “Politics, reli-
gion, recreation, education, health, welfare, economics, mass media, science, etc.” 
Among them, goals of education, health and science can be best compatible with other 
develop goals. David Smith, Dimensions and Categories of Voluntary Organiza-
tions/NGOs, NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q., 116-120 (Apr. 1973). 
 188. FOUCAULT, supra note 186, 30. 
 189. JORDAN, supra note 176, at 509, 3733. 
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Aspect 
4 Military, Autonomy, Territory Vague, Diffuse, Unspecified 
goals 
 
As the level moves up, clarity of the “Goals of Subjects” goes 
downward, and the degree of difficulty for NGOs’ survival increases.  
If a subject like “Science/Technology”（except for some special are-
as getting involved with intense national interests like space technol-
ogy and energy） can lay a foundation for NGOs to develop pro-
grams with clearly defined and precise goals, it is ideal for NGOs in 
terms of survival.  No NGO can excise a representative power for 
various sovereign states in a site of justice, for these areas lack a 
method of governing through programs with precise goals. 
To sum up, the ideal subject for an NGO is one with clearly de-
fined, precise goals and is isolated or compatible with other subjects 
lest drawing governments’ hostility.  Then the following question is: 
if there is an ideal subject that has both characters, what kind of asso-
ciation can be expected for NGOs that operate on it? 
The Character of Association Brought about by NGOs 
A. From Cooperation to Association. 
In the previous part, our analysis was confined within a single 
NGO.  Within a NGO, groups of people gather together hierarchical-
ly and are assigned respective works according to specific goals.190  
The general relationship among the individuals in a NGO is coopera-
tion.  We must distinguish cooperation from association.  Unlike co-
operation within an organization, the association presumes plural 
subjects in various kinds of relationships, such as competition.191  Of 
course, individuals within a single NGO also have competitive rela-
tionships with each other.  However, this competition is often influ-
enced by the administrative structure and functional structure based 
on the division of labor of the organization.  While the competitions 
among subjects in an association always happen among equal sub-
jects, the association provides an open field for various organizations 
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to chase their own goals.192  The competitions among them are not 
confined by the administrative structure and functional structure be-
cause of the division of labor of the organization.  So the association 
is closer to an equilibrium system rather than an administrative sys-
tem.  No matter how fierce the competition is among subjects, this 
system at least has a shared formal rules which contributes to estab-
lish the game and some shared values. A healthy state is a typical civ-
il association. Likewise, this paper categorizes NGO as a special co-
operation among individuals, while the society idealized by NGOs is 
considered a joint unit. 
The process of thriving NGOs is the same process for reproduc-
ing their way of governing.  When NGOs might acquire the dominant 
role in the whole society, they are socialized and reshape the social 
association by their reproductive works.  Though the association pre-
sumes competition among subjects, it also constitutes a system of 
basic rules for them.  As Luschen Gunther claims, “even among par-
ties at war, there is a certain amount of mutual understanding.”193  So 
the mutual understanding is nothing abnormal in a social association.  
The mutual understanding among NGOs helps to form the main char-
acter of the social association dominant and also idealized by NGOs.  
What might it be? 
At the beginning of the ninth chapter, Mr. Szazi quoted a section 
from McDougal, Laswell, and Reisman’s paper: “posterity may char-
acterize our period as the renascent of the individual.”194 What is the 
meaning of “the renascent of the individual?”  Does it mean that “the 
sovereign nation-states...would come to an end and the whole interna-
tional society is governed by mass?”195  Mr. Szazi rebukes this radical 
point of view. It may destroy the pillars of international law and re-
ject its own essence, “i.e., the respect to fundamental freedoms of ex-
pression and self-government” which may doom the individuals.196  
On the contrary, he believes that the real renascent of the individu-
al, from the perspective of pluralism, presumes an “international sys-
tem supported in various long-established legal doctrines.”197  Under 
 
 192. Id. 
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this presumption, through non-governmental organizations, individu-
als could “interact with the United Nations,” which could compensate 
for lack of inter-nationality in the system of states and nations.198  It 
can be inferred from Mr. Szazi’s work that the proliferation of NGOs 
could contribute to the real “renascent of the individual.”  Is that the 
truth in any case? 
This, he claims, is the position of legitimate subjects for 
NGOs.199  If NGOs come to be the legitimate subjects, they will enter 
into field of politics as active actors.  Therefore, his claim is not 
about the general relationship between NGOs and individuals; rather, 
he suggests endowing NGOs with direct political effect.  Politics, in 
its broadest sense, is the activity through which individuals make, 
preserve, and amend the general rules by which they live.200 As active 
actors in international politics, NGOs have possibilities to make their 
desires and goals compulsory ones.  Through these desires and goals, 
NGOs could expand and reproduce their ways of cooperation and 
shape international human society into a new kind of association.   
B. Premises.  
In order to analyze the possible political impact to individuals by 
NGOs, we can suppose an extreme situation for NGOs, which means 
to create an ideal international political environment for them.  We 
can suppose the NGOs acquire a predominant position in internation-
al politics that results in NGOs being able to create a civil society by 
their nature, without any distortion from the impact of states and in-
tergovernmental organizations.  This assumption can be embodied 
through confining the discussion into international politics rather than 
domestic politics. It is more reasonable to set this constraint to our 
discussion because it is much more difficult to imagine that a domes-
tic NGO occupies the rudder of politics within a state. There is no 
dominant subject in international politics like the sovereign state in 
domestic politics.  Based on this premise, NGOs might provide a new 
chance for instituting international association that never existed.   
The same premise can be further embodied by this state-
ment：NGOs also have a dominant position over other subjects in in-
 
 198. Id. at 276-77. 
 199. Id. at 272. 
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ternational politics like states and IGOs.  In experience, the impacts 
from states and other kinds of international organizations always op-
press and distort the actions of NGOs.  If we remove these impacts by 
granting the dominant position to NGOs in international politics, the 
association shaped by NGOs is clearly presented to us.   
With this assumption, we can make a thought experiment to ad-
dress the following question: if the international society is shaped and 
dominated only by NGOs, what does it look like?  According to the 
earlier part of the paper, an abstract subject that can also nurture pre-
cise goals tends to idealize NGOs.  Under the double ideal premis-
es—the ideal subjects being the internal condition for NGOs and the 
ideal environment of politics, which is the external condition—what 
kind of global human society would be nurtured through the associa-
tion impulse by NGOs?  Can this new pattern of association in inter-
national politics really promote the emancipation of individuals or be 
compatible with the profits of individuals?  
C. Enterprise Association.  
On idealistic subjects, NGOs easily concentrate on clearly de-
fined and precise goals. The goals are supposed to be shared by 
members of NGOs.  Individuals who take part in the association in 
forms of NGOs connect each other through a common purpose or in-
terest.  Mr. Oakeshott once defined this kind of cooperation on the 
foundation of specific purposes as enterprise association.201 Such as-
sociation is to give an intelligible account of their relationship “only 
by specifying the object, the purpose, or the interest in terms of why 
they are related.”202 Then we can also categorize areas like science 
and technology or even environment and social problem as areas for 
enterprises.  Areas of enterprise are easy for NGOs to multiply.  Ac-
cordingly, NGOs in these areas are always present as enterprise asso-
ciation of individuals. 
According to specific purposes in a particular field, the NGO an-
alyzes itself by constitute according to the natural or functional at-
tributes of the regions.  NGOs are confined by their goals, which lead 
the sub-level goals making and aiming to effectively achieve the final 
goals.  It means that clearly defined and precise goals in particular ar-
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eas not only contribute to an ideal condition for NGOs, but also bind 
them. Natural or functional attributes of the regions, in the perspec-
tive of an NGO, may not coincide with political boundaries.  In order 
to fulfill the ideal allocation of the regional goals of governance, 
NGOs tend to ignore all the political boundaries of the states, which 
is not, of course, compatible with states’ interests. 
In a specific area, NGOs are prone to unite or absorb a dominant 
one by nature, other than keep the separate situation perpetual.  Rob-
ert Nozick, a professor at Harvard University, suggested that, in the 
state of nature, a dominant protective association gradually substi-
tutes diverse protective associations.203  The NGOs are different from 
protective associations which are viewed as “larva” of the states. The 
discrepancy makes the uniting process much easier for diverse NGOs 
to be absorbed by a dominant NGO in specific area.   The most sig-
nificant difference between them is that the NGOs do not seek to mo-
nopolize the coercive force by their nature.  The issue of monopoliz-
ing the coercive force, of course, is always involved with fierce 
disputes or even wars, which may make the chaos persist.  On the 
contrary, NGOs always associate individuals mainly through interests 
inducing, by claiming to seek for common wealth in particular areas.  
So the dominant NGO in the specific area is imaginable.  Besides, to 
solve problems or make efficient progress in a specific area, NGOs 
need the knowledge and technology of expertise.  The power struc-
ture of professional knowledge and technology are exclusive plural 
subjects by nature. Therefore, the premise of plural NGOs will hinder 
the idealization of integrating resources in applying professional 
knowledge and technology. The NGOs are prone to unite by nature.  
The idealized NGO is believed as the one that has the position of 
monopoly in a specific area. 
Then we can suggest that the international system is only consti-
tuted by three states: A, B and C; and also, three areas α,β and γ make 
up the multi-aspects of common interests.  In order to achieve maxi-
mum output to fulfill the special purpose in α, goals in regions of A, 
B, and C should be distributed respectively as αA, αB, and αC, if and 
only if sum of αA+αB+αC is maximum, and so on.  On contrary, to 
maximize country A’s benefit, goals in ares α, β, and γ should be dis-
tributed respectively as Aα, Aβ, and Aγ, if and only if sum of 
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Aα+Aβ+Aγ is maximum, and so on.  Then we can list goals distribu-
tion in diverse areas and regions according to two different stand-






A B C R.D According 
to Areas 
α Aα αA Bα αB Cα αC αA+αB+αC 
β Aβ βA Bβ βB Cβ βC βA+βB+βC 
γ Aγ γA Bγ γB Cγ γC γA+γB+γC 
R.D According 
to State 
Aα+Aβ+Aγ Bα+Bβ+Bγ Cα+Cβ+Cγ Common  
Interests 
 
It is plain that Aα is by no means identified with αA, and Aβ is 
by no means identified with βA, and so on.  To achieve a specific 
goal, NGOs should adopt rational distribution according to maximum 
output in geographic areas it operates, and will reject goals in particu-
lar regions preferred allocated by states.   It is easy for us to conclude 
that NGOs are guided by their fixed goals in specific areas and tend 
to suppress states’ goals if they can predominate politics.  Amongst 
the two perspectives, individual are the core of the national perspec-
tive, while NGOs share a premise of a highly non-personalized per-
spective and cannot represent the individuals.  For only the natural or 
functional attributes of the regions will be taken into consideration, 
and also the voice of individuals is silenced by professional 
knowledge for achieving the particular goals efficiently.  In interna-
tional politics, only sovereign states, as persons204 behind interests 
and goals, can represent individuals, if it legalized by a reasonable 
political process.205  If the effects of states are overridden by that of 
NGOs in international society, individuals will be led to doom.  Be-
sides, there are also separate perspectives to calculate common inter-
ests or common goals.   
At the standpoint of NGOs, common interests consist of interests 
in diverse areas.  As a result, to maximize common interests, the 
maximum of αA+αB+αC, βA+βB+βC, and γA+γB+γC should be ful-
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filled simultaneously.  However, it is nearly impossible to achieve 
this goal.  For the goal in area α is considered by no means compati-
ble with the goals in β and γ.  As Oakeshott believed, “genuinely con-
flicting purposes or interests may make it difficult for an agent to 
embrace certain combinations of enterprise association.”206  There-
fore, the goals expected by NGOs are only “contingently connected 
with the common purpose or interest concerned.”207  On the other 
hand, the real joint purpose or interest can only be expected in the 
system of states.  Though facing immeasurable difficulties, joint pur-
pose or interest can be achieved by an idealized discourse among 
sovereign states. Finally, representative democracy can open a door 
for individuals to take part in the international politics. 
D. Closed International Society. 
When the policies enforced by states, according to their sover-
eign in the specific area, are discordant with the governance of 
NGOs, there is tension.  Similarly, in a state, it is nothing but colli-
sion among classes and individuals caused by their diverse decisions 
that leads to tension.  Karl Popper has defined an open society as one 
“in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions.”208  For 
the states to claim their authority to make decisions in complex situa-
tion, we can say the international society constituted by sovereign 
states is an open society. 
As we have noted, abstract fields and subjects are the important 
elements to contribute to an ideal environment for NGOs. This ideal 
circumstance makes NGOs operating abstractly a great benefit of it.  
Operating abstractly, as we have explained, means getting rid of ob-
stacles by states’ actions.  Geographical space, in perspective of IN-
GOs, tends to exclude political space of territories.209 The utopia of 
the international society dominated by the governance of INGO is the 
very association without tension.  Absence of social tension, as Pop-
per argues, is the character of “a tribal closed society” which “may be 
based on slavery does not create in itself a social tension, because 
slaves sometimes form no more part of society than its cattle; their 
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aspirations and problems do not necessarily create anything that is 
felt by the rulers as a problem within society.”210   
Of course, there are seldom any similarities between individuals 
or states in modern global society and slaves in ancient society.211  
However, what we take into consideration is not experienced in mod-
ern global society.  This analogy is on the premise of the ideal envi-
ronment of NGO.  Under this assumption, individuals as well as 
states, though important in general, will not create any problems per-
ceived by the INGOs.  According to this analogy, a NGO predomi-
nated international world is a “closed society,” which has as its creed 
that the individual is nothing. 
There is still an unsolved problem hindering this analogy.  Ac-
cording to Popper, a closed society is characterized by the belief in 
magical taboos212 and submission to magical force213 which is a mys-
tical unity,214 and hostile to reason,215 while an open society is marked 
by rationalism216 and critical217 thought.  An NGO is much closer to 
the production of reason than magical force.  How can we identify an 
international society dominated by NGOs as a closed society?  The 
problem is created by confusing different categories of reason.  
Which kind of reason is the mother of NGO?  Is it the same one that 
gives birth to the open society?  If we clarify the meanings of term 
“reason” in different settings, all the confusions could be wiped out.   
In Plato’s work, reason acts as one of the three elements of spirit, 
the other two being courage and want.218  Reason is “the ability to be-
have reasonably and with judgment”219 and dwells in the upper region 
of the soul.  It is a good guide for human behavior in any occasion 
without limiting itself to logical aspects — the point of which also 
inherited by Aristotle, for reason always functions in super-logical 
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aspects of life.220  It is reason that endows humans with the ability of 
communication by means of language.  Somewhat close to Popper’s 
argument, Aristotle identified reason to making reasonable argu-
ments.  Reason in eyes of is Greek philosophers is an emancipator ra-
ther than a disaster to individuals.   
Reason has had multiple meanings for a long time, it has been 
defined as “the capacity for consciously making sense of things, ap-
plying logic, establishing and verifying facts, and changing or justify-
ing practices, institutions, and beliefs based on new or existing in-
formation.”221 However, it is narrowed gradually into the logical 
aspect of the world.  When scientism began to spread all over the Eu-
rope beginning in the Seventeenth Century with an arrogant belief 
that the truth of everything is logic and experience observed; reason 
came to be viewed as a productive system which produces truth 
through theories by enforcing logic forms to observed experiences.222  
In this period, though reason was confined into a solo aspect of logic, 
it was also compatible to various values. 
Since the Nineteenth Century, utility has increasingly encom-
passed all the traditional values.223  Reason began to act as a servant 
of technology and helped in calculating profit and loss in interests.224 
Reason and utility contributed to establish the “regime of verifica-
tion” which, according to Foucault, “is not a law of truth, but a set of 
rules enabling one to establish which statements in a given discourse 
can be described as true or false.”225 In the public fields, a regime of 
truth that only operated in science before and, according to Hobbes,226 
by no means entered into fields of practice, connected up to govern-
ing practice for the first time.  A regime of truth sanctified this kind 
of reason and blocked its other aspects from its traditional meaning. 
In the modern world, reason has a close connection with “a new 
technology of the exercise of power.”227  Michel Foucault keeps a 
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close eye on this innovation, which “begins to exercise itself through 
social production and social service.”228  This new technology has re-
defined the problems in some fields such as “demography, public 
health, hygiene, housing conditions, longevity and fertility,”229 which 
are the very soil of NGOs’ thriving.  Dealing with problems in these 
new fields, “a real and effective ‘incorporation’ of power was neces-
sary”230 for NGOs.  Under the regime of truth, reason being in its new 
form, is believed to be the best tool to achieve this aim for it can pro-
vide both truth and efficiency.  On the one hand, the regime of truth 
makes any rational criticism of the new kind of reason inconceiva-
ble.231  On the other hand, it also helps reason create some rules for 
NGOs under the name of governing according to truth concerning 
these two phenomena.  Reason, throughout the cooperation inspired 
by NGOs’ operations, is a perfect substitute for magic force and ta-
boo in a closed society.  According to Mr. Oakeshott, it is just this 
new form of reason that is destructive to individuality.232 
Popper claims reason, a character of an open society, is identi-
fied with arguments.  Arguments suggest multi-subjects, thus making 
reason individualized.  The real open society exists only when indi-
viduals can use reason to plan as they see fit and express themselves 
in the public world.  This highly individualized reason is the same as 
the one in Hobbes’ theory.233  In Hobbes’ theory human beings are 
not considered to be irrational creations.  Rather, their reason is high-
ly individualized.234  Any form of acquired universal reason is not le-
gitimate.  This individualized reason led to chaos in international pol-
itics in the Seventeenth Century which is also believed to be the 
golden age of autonomy according to Richard Tuck.235  Similarly, ac-
cording to Popper’s point of view, conflict is the result of the indi-
vidualized reason, and is widespread in the open society.  On the con-
trary, reason in the context of NGOs is supported by the regime of 
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truth, which sweeps out any conflicts and brings doom to the individ-
uals.  If international society is dominated by the governance of 
NGOs, individuals can hardly cause conflicts and create tension from 
inside, and are easily ignored in politics. 
Then what does it matter to the NGO?  If there is no big tension 
from inside, its relation with objects acquires an incomparable im-
portance.  Then the answer could be some external menace.  What is 
external menace?  The external menace acts as “fortune” to NGOs.  
The term “fortune” is borrowed from the politic theory of classic re-
publicanism.  Fortune is defined in classic republicanism as the force 
which directs contingent events, and thus “symbolizes pure, uncon-
trolled, and illegitimated contingency.”236  Fortune is always used to 
describe the relationship between the sovereign and the objects of its 
governing.  In this perspective, individuals are not connected or gov-
erned directly by the sovereign who rules them.  The sovereign only 
deals with the phenomenon of politics, which is the positive or nega-
tive impact caused by individuals.  As a result, a “thin phenomenal 
theme of interest”237 of impact is imposed between sovereign as gov-
ernor and their individuals.  Thus, the voice of individuals is blocked 
by this kind of “thin phenomenal theme.”  Concerning the way to 
govern a newly conquered republic, Machiavelli grimly suggested to 
the new king of this land “the safest way is to destroy them or to re-
side there.”238  In this case, the sovereign does not take new citizens 
as individuals “in themselves” into consideration.  He only cares 
about the hazard of subverting the sovereign brought about by “ha-
tred, and desire for vengeance.”239  The voice of individuals is si-
lenced in this kind of governance. 
Similarly, NGOs also govern through this kind of “thin phenom-
enal theme of interests.”  This goal of governance is far from satisfy-
ing the real and diverse needs of individuals.  The method of it is to 
make projects to achieve specific goals.  Individuals are treated as an 
undifferentiated unity, and only positive or negative interests of this 
unity will be considered in the process of governance.  This kind of 
governance can also cover particular areas such as democracy and 
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human rights.  For example, some pro-democratization NGOs are 
immersed in the task of strengthening the taproots of democracy, and 
are making positive impacts on the democratization processes occur-
ring in South Africa, Tajikistan and Argentina.240 Despite whatever 
accomplishments these NGOs have achieved, democracy is still re-
garded as an unfinished social project of commonwealth.  In the case 
of pro-democratization NGOs, individuals are still not considered di-
rectly in their governance.   
What is most important is not the special areas or subjects NGOs 
deal with, but rather the way of their governance.  If democracy is 
considered as a magnificent project rather than a kind of association 
of various citizens, and if human rights are treated as a common-
wealth of human race as a whole rather than the precious value of 
every man, individuals will be submerged in this splendid prospect as 
well.  In other words, there is no demos underlying NGO’s govern-
ance.  J. H. H. Weiler, a professor and the European Union Jean 
Monnet Chair at the New York University School of Law, has sug-
gested, “there is no convincing account of democracy without de-
mos.”241  Even under our ideal premise, pro-democratization NGOs 
can never achieve their goals for the mission if it is not compatible 
with the governance because of their nature.242 
E. Additional Remarks. 
Some critics may say our analysis is based on the idealized 
premise.  Hence in experience, NGOs cease to reproduce this kind of 
association into other areas that cannot provide ideal subjects for 
them.  Considering that the ideal subjects exist only in a few select 
areas among various areas of our full experience, NGOs are far from 
a threat to politics.  This criticism confuses our method and our goal.  
Please remember that the aim of studying the premise of idealistic 
subjects is to reveal the association brought about by NGOs without 
any distortion.  The idealized subjects premise is concerned with the 
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methodologies.  If we achieve our research goal, the premise could be 
removed.  When the premise is removed, the characters of society are 
reduced to a future possibility, and the potential impact to politics 
brought about by NGOs. 
How could it be? What really threaten politics are not NGOs as 
subjects in the international world.  The true threat is the particular 
technology of governance carried by NGOs.  In other words, NGOs 
are mere mediums of this technology of governance.  The increasing 
impact of NGOs in some areas of international politics can open the 
door for the invasion of this technology of governance into all areas.  
What lies at the foundation of this technology is an external perspec-
tive, which is prone to view every issue as a program, and leads to the 
doom of individuals.243  This pattern of governance tends to repro-
duce the external perspective into every area through particular sub-
jects such as NGOs. 
Michel Foucault once discovered this kind of technology origi-
nated in the theories and practice of governance of states in Eight-
eenth Century Europe.244  He found that the term “population” which 
is “absolutely foreign to the juridical and political thought of earlier 
centuries” gradually converted the old notion “people” into poli-
tics,245 the “multiplicity of individuals” on which the term “popula-
tion” has no claim, dwell in the notion of “people.” The notion of 
“population” as “a new collective subject” premises an external per-
spective in which the people as themselves never exist.  Only the 
numerical aspect of people is considered in population through its 
contribution to interest.246  In the new kind of governance, the final 
objective is the population.  As Foucault suggested, “the population is 
pertinent as the objective, and individuals, the series of individuals, 
are no longer pertinent as the objective, but simply as the instrument, 
relay, or condition for obtaining something at the level of the popula-
tion.”247  When art of government replaced sovereignty, which meant 
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the changing perspective, population substituted people and emerged 
a new object in the practice of politics.248 
In fact, the method applied to deal with issues depends on the 
technology of governance.  The different notions are the carriers of 
diverse perspectives.  Basically, the particular perspective is con-
structive to the technology of governance.  Therefore, the answer of 
“how to deal with it” does not depend on the question “what to deal 
with,” rather it relies on “how to view it.”  In other words, the pillar 
and the foundation of governance is not the objects or issues being 
dealt with, but the perspective which helps to construct them; there-
fore, what really matters is not the particular area or subject, but the 
specific perspective premised by the governance.  Even in the same 
area, diverse perspectives lead to construct their subjects in totally 
different ways. 
For example, the reason that the issues of international politics 
before the Twentieth Century concentrated on war and peace does not 
mean the aspects of other issues preferred by the modern internation-
al world could not be entered into the discussion.  In fact, internation-
al trade and other issues always lie at the center of international poli-
tics, but in the perspective of sovereign state dominated by the notion 
of autonomy, every significant issue was viewed as the representation 
of conflict and cooperation among sovereign states.  Likewise, when 
the perspective is changed, the subject of war and peace may also be 
workable for NGOs.  When wars break out amongst diverse states, 
the subject of security absorbs concerns for justice and states’ inter-
ests they are viewed as a new kind of program—anti-terrorism.  The 
most significant difference between war and anti-terrorism is diverse 
perspectives.  In the battle among the states, each side claims to act 
justly to legislate its actions.  While in the state of anti-terrorism, the 
enemy is viewed as terrorism, a problem that needs to be resolved, or 
as a threat poised to remove states’ security.  The voices of the ene-
mies are silenced by this demo-voice-damping technology supported 
by the external perspective.  Though lacking military power, NGOs 
are seldom able to work on this area.  However, the battle-field re-
constructed by this external perspective already has the possibility to 
open the door for NGOs.  
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Above all, just like every important issue where views are repre-
sentatives of war and peace in the Seventeenth Century, every solu-
tion to major problems in the contemporary international field can be 
reconstructed by the external perspective into a project for govern-
ance of NGOs.  The demo-voice-damping function of this new tech-
nology of governance can reform every area from discussions of mul-
ti-subjects to programs.  
Conclusion: The Correct Position of NGOs in International 
Politics.  
In order to clarify our discussion, we limit the term “politics” to 
the narrow sense: the practicing of coercive power.249  Creating poli-
cy and legislation are two major ways to practice coercive power.  
Under the principle of democracy, this kind of coercive power is as-
signed to an active legal status.  This positive legal status not only re-
quires the subjects themselves to belong to the law, but also requires 
them to be legislators or policy makers.  However, in most cases, 
NGOs cannot properly function in policy making.  They are always 
granted consultative status in international policy making.  Legal per-
sonality always means a more reliable identification for active partic-
ipants in politics.  Peter Willetts, Emeritus Professor of Global Poli-
tics at City University of London, has demonstrated special cases 
which can bear witness to the legal personality of NGOs.250  He dis-
covered that some NGOs take part into international politics in one of 
the following forms: being equal to states in international diplomacy; 
being among the Observers at the UN General Assembly; having a 
special role in procedures for handling human rights and the envi-
ronment; or by participating in intergovernmental committees.251  Be-
sides, “there are currently more than 1,500 NGOs which work in col-
laboration with states on a basis of equality of statutes and equal 
participation right, including the ultimate right of voting on authorita-
tive decisions.”252 He claims that, “states, transnational NGOs, inter-
governmental organizations, international non-governmental organi-
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zations, and hybrid international organizations are...participants in the 
international legal system.”253  Through several advocates state, 
NGOs can be expected to have broader rights for legislation and 
more stable statues of legal personality.   
Can NGOs be seen as competent actors in politics by participat-
ing in legislation and equipping with coercive power?  Of course not.  
In the core meaning of politics, coercive power cannot be separated 
from its law side, which means the norms of political power should 
be studied as well in specific areas.  In traditional theory, politics is a 
site of justice.  Everything that is attached to politics is a site of jus-
tice as well. For example, the market in the Middle Ages and the Six-
teenth and Seventeenth Centuries was a site of justice.254  Then what 
is a site of justice?  Without doubts, state of nature is a typical site of 
justice.  In state of nature, as John Locke depicted, “the execution of 
the law of nature is...put into every man’s hand.”255  Actors in a site 
of justice are equipped in their claims of justice.  The next question 
is, what is justice?    
A basic element constituting the presupposition of justice is 
harmony.256  When analyzing the justice in the state, Cicero said, 
through the person of Scipio that: 
Just as with string instruments or pipes or in singers’ voices 
a certain harmony of different sounds must be maintained, 
and as that harmony, though arising from the management 
of very different notes, produces a pleasing and agreeable 
sound, so a state, by adjusting the proportions between the 
highest, lowest, and intermediate classes, as if they were 
musical notes, achieves...and such concord cannot exist at 
all without justice.257  
Actually, the special “subject—state” is not important in the ex-
planation.  Cicero’s purpose was to reveal the relationship of justice 
and harmony by making an analogy between music and justice.  Ac-
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cording to Dooyeweerd, justice indicates “a harmonizing process 
preventing from any excess.”258  It means that, the subjects in the 
field of politics should either act as agencies “weighing all the inter-
ests against each other in a retributive sense,”259 to enforce this har-
monizing process as the state sovereign does in domestic politics, or 
create an open stage of justice as states do in international politics.   
NGOs can chose neither of the two ways.  An NGO, by its na-
ture, is a goal-achieving mechanism or good-product system, not 
compatible with the nucleus of politics.  Furthermore, concerning 
“public justice involves harmonizing the various interests,”260 if there 
are no diverse interests, there is no harmony.  Meaning that harmony 
is a particular relationship among individuals or other subjects 
through the medium of interests, or we can say plural subjects are the 
logical presupposition of justice.  The model of governance of NGO 
can only distinguish different parts which are absorbed into an overall 
goal according to their natural features and functional assignment.  
Then the governance of NGOs cannot contribute a harmonizing pro-
cess.  By contrast, it is the NGO that represents particular interests or 
common good, which need to be further harmonized by politics.  In 
other words, the association operated by NGOs only have potential 
properties in jural aspects until it is actualized by real subjects in poli-
tics.  Roy Clouser defined the jural function concerning this kind of 
subjects as a “Passive Function.”261 This function means that the sub-
jects can only function objectively in a process of politics.  Then we 
can conclude that NGOs can only function passively in politics. 
If the NGOs fail to fulfill the law or norm aspect of politics, it is 
unreasonable for them to acquire coercive force, which is supported 
by monopolizing violence in politics.  In traditional political theory, 
the state governs by monopolizing violence.262  Even in modern in-
ternational politics, states have to pay the price when they have bro-
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ken treaties among nations or other kinds of international law through 
the imposition of sanctions, a form of the application of coercive 
force.  To the contrary, Thomas Risse claims that the modern practice 
of politics has proved that monopolization of violence is not the only 
way to govern.263  Interests can substitute violence in governance.  He 
says “[p]ositive incentives as well as sanctions are meant to affect the 
cost-benefit calculations of the relevant parties and to induce the de-
sired behavior.”264  This new kind of governance “aims at challenging 
fixed interests and preferences so that actors are induced in a sociali-
zation process to internalize new rules and norms.”265  Actors like 
firms and especially NGOs always adopt this way of governance.  
Nevertheless, Risse’s assertion can only be applied in situations lack-
ing a coercive force that does not conform to our narrow definition of 
politics, and not the case in international society.266  Where coercive 
force already exists, the rules and norms induced by NGOs through 
challenging fixed interests and preferences can only be considered a 
part of politics when they are authorized or at least acquiesced by 
it.267  Risse has correctly indicated that until now, NGOs govern 
mainly through the choices of individuals, rather than coercive 
force.268  The ideal civil society is the heaven of choices.  NGOs are 
ingenious inventions for fulfilling the choices of individuals and 
promoting the vitality of civil society.  Therefore, there is no con-
demnation for them to thrive in civil society. 
Is it right for NGOs to be equipped with coercive force?  The an-
swer is definitely no.  For granting them legislative power is totally 
another thing. The will of a NGO, as an enterprise association, “is 
necessarily constituted by the continuous choice of each associate to 
be related to others in terms of a common purpose, a choice from 
which he/she must be able to extricate themselves.”  As Mr. 
Oakeshott has suggested, “compulsory enterprise association is a 
self-contradiction.”269  If NGOs step over their boundaries and ac-
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quire coercive force, they contradict themselves and undermine inter-
national politics.   
Szazi’s study introduced the NGOs’ influence on international 
politics and law in its current state: NGOs not only have acquired le-
gal personality “in several formal sources of law, notably treaties and 
customary international law,”270 but also, act as “shapers of policy and 
indispensable bridges between the general public and the intergov-
ernmental processes” other than merely as “disseminators of infor-
mation.”271   
However, his study cannot deny the fact that, no matter what in-
fluences NGOs have brought, they still act passively in world politics 
and without sharing coercive force.  If NGOs keep within their 
boundaries, they could, as Szazi argues, “constitute a remarkable con-
tribution to pluralism at the international level and, even more im-
portantly, a fundamental gust of fresh air in the bureaucracy.”272  But 
if they seek for status of legitimate subjects, and ask for taking part in 
the process of making decisions with coercive force in international 
politics, by the chance of current inadequacy of formal political struc-
ture for international problem-solving and decision-making,273 they 
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